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BEYOND MERIT SELECTION
Luke Bierman*
The foundation for an independent federal judiciary is embodied
in the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution vests the judicial power
of the United States in the Supreme and inferior courts.' Federal
judges are appointed by the executive subject to Senate confirma-
tion.2 They serve terms limited only by "good behavior"'3 and re-
ceive salaries that cannot be "diminished during their continuance
in office." 4 Authority, selection, tenure and compensation are thus
the bellwethers for assessing judicial independence.
State judiciaries are varied in terms of judicial authority, selec-
tion, tenure, and compensation.' These broad differences among
the states influence the independence of a particular judicial sys-
tem. Some judges are elected while others are appointed, and in
both cases, there is much variation in how selections are made.6
Judicial terms range from just a few years to life tenure.7 Salaries
approximate those of the federal judiciary in some states, but are
much smaller in others.8
Of the factors comprising judicial independence, judicial selec-
tion receives the most attention. A number of organizations focus
on studying judicial selection and offering suggestions for its im-
provement.9 The popular press gives significant attention to state
* Director, American Bar Association Justice Center. B.A., Colgate University;
J.D., Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the College of William and Mary in Virginia;
M.A., Ph.D., State University of New York at Albany. The views expressed in this
article are only those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies
of the American Bar Association.
1. U.S. CONST., art. III, sec. 1.
2. Id., at art. II, sec. 2.
3. Id., at art. III, sec. 1.
4. Id.
5. See generally Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries
and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689 (1995) (discussing the judicial selection
procedure and the impact of different judicial selection methods on judicial review).
6. Larry Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States, 64 JUDICATURE 176, 178-
93 (1980).
7. Id.
8. Cheryl Frank, Judges Wanted: Who Can Afford the Honor?, 71 A.B.A. J. 25
(1985).
9. See, e.g., ABA, STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS (2000); THE CONSTITUTION
PROJECT, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S COURTS (2000).
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judicial selection issues.10 Much scholarship focuses on issues af-
fecting judicial selection.1' Indeed, no topic considered by judicial
process scholars receives as much attention as judicial selection.12
Much of this attention results from the ongoing debate regarding
the appointment or election of judges. The controversy over ap-
pointment or election goes back to the early years of the Republic,
and became more heated in the early twentieth century when merit
selection was proposed as an alternative to straightforward execu-
tive appointment and popular election. Merit selection became the
goal of reformers seeking to diminish the prevalence of popular
elections for judges, while making appointment palatable to advo-
cates of election. Missouri adopted merit selection in 1940. Soon
thereafter, merit selection was used in thirty-four states and the
District of Columbia for selecting at least some judges, especially
appellate judges. 13
Yet, in the last thirteen years, only one state, Rhode Island, has
established merit selection, and only after a series of public scan-
dals involving its high court.14 Last November, Florida voters in
every county rejected a referendum to implement merit selection
for trial judges. 15 Legislatures in Texas, North Carolina, and else-
where have considered merit selection for appellate judges, but
have chosen not to implement it.16 Pennsylvania, with Governor
10. A series of New York Times articles, for example, ran during the November
2000 election cycle detailing controversial elections in states like Illinois, Michigan,
and Ohio. William Glaberson, A Bipartisan Effort to Remove Politics From Judicial
Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000, at 18; William Glaberson, A Spirited Campaign for
Ohio Court Puts Judges on New Terrain, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2000, at 15; William
Glaberson, Court Rulings Curb Efforts to Rein in Judicial Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2000, §A, at 9; William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal a New Era for State
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2000, at 1; William Glaberson, States Taking Steps to Rein
in Excesses of Judicial Politicking, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at 1; William Glaberson,
U.S. Chamber Will Promote Business Views In Court Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2000, at 24.
11. See, e.g., Larry Berkson, Judicial Selection in the States, 64 JUDICATURE 176
(1980); Elliot E. Slotnick, Review Essay on Judicial Recruitment and Selection, 13
JUST. SYS. J. 109 (1988).
12. Philip L. DuBois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State
Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 S.W. L.J. 31 (1986).
13. See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 9, at 89. It should be noted that
ten of these states use a form of merit selection for interim vacancies, id., thereby
diminishing the prevalence of merit selection. Some eighty percent of all judges stand
for some type of election. Id.
14. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
15. Editorial, Judicial Elections, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 14, 2000.
16. See, e.g., Rob Christensen, Who Killed the Merit Plan for Judges?, NEWS &
OBSERVER (RALEIGH N.C.), July 9, 1999; Bruce Davidson, Editorial, Judicial Politics
See Some Reform, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June 24, 2001, at 2G.
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Tom Ridge's support, is making a serious effort to enact merit se-
lection for appellate judges. The outcome, however, is far from
certain.17
The lack of momentum for merit selection at the beginning of
the twenty-first century seems ironic. The increasing presence of
money in judicial elections, with concomitant concerns about jus-
tice for sale, would seem to pose an excellent opportunity for advo-
cates of merit selection. Reform, however, remains elusive. What
then remains for those who wish to improve judicial selection?
Where does the merit selection constituency go if merit selection is
not a viable alternative?
This Article will review some of the factors that have diminished
merit selection's appeal. It will examine why merit selection has
never been an entirely successful answer for reformers seeking to
diminish partisanship in judicial selection. It will suggest address-
ing other aspects of the judicial office to promote judicial indepen-
dence. It will conclude by suggesting an educational credential for
becoming a judge. This credential would accomplish the objectives
advanced by merit selection advocates. It would offer legitimacy to
judicial aspirants and would provide independent, accountable, im-
partial, and well-trained judges regardless of the selection method
used by any given state.
I. THE APPEAL OF MERIT SELECTION
One of the colonists' indictments against King George was that
"He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure
of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries."' 8
The adoption of executive or legislative appointment of judges by
the colonies in their state constitutions was a direct reaction to the
concern raised in the Declaration of Independence. During the
first years of the Republic, and with the advent of Jacksonian de-
mocracy in the middle 1800s, 19 fears over executive prerogative
17. See generally James Eisenstein, Financing Pennsylvania's Supreme Court Can-
didates, 84 JUDICATURE 10 (2000); News Release, Office of Governor, Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, Gov. Ridge Begins Historic Effort to Create Appointive
System for Selecting Appellate Judges (Apr. 10, 2001). While this article was being
written, Governor Ridge resigned to serve as director of homeland security, placing
the fate of merit selection in Pennsylvania in further doubt. Ann Gerhart, Tom Ridge,
on High Alert; The Nation's New Chief of Homeland Security Takes On an Impossible
Job With a Can-Do Attitude, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at CO.
18. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
19. Timothy Kelley, The Presidency Powers Up, N.Y. TIMES UPFRONT, Sept. 17,
2001, at 26.
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arose. Concerns about abuse of the appointment power and the
resulting concentration of power in the executive produced a trend
toward popular election of judges in the states. Many agreed with
Andrew Jackson who argued that "judges should be made respon-
sible to the party by periodical elections."2 Mississippi adopted ju-
dicial elections in 183221 and was followed by every state to enter
the union after 1845.2 Several other states also abandoned their
appointive system in favor of election. 3
This preference for elections was designed to support judicial in-
dependence.24 As popularly elected officials, judges, and thus their
decisions, would be subject to greater public trust and confidence.
In addition, judges surviving an election battle would have the
savvy to decide cases in ways that other branches of government
would find respectful and appropriate. Bad judges would be sub-
ject to removal at election time.
As time went on, however, the weaknesses of judicial elections
became apparent. During the Progressive Era, concerns arose that
elected judges were too dependent on political parties for their of-
fice. Among the objections raised to judicial elections were low
voter interest in judicial elections, excessive campaign fundraising,
and unseemly campaign conduct.2 5 Still, non-partisan elections
were not an ideal solution. Without party affiliation as a cue, vot-
ers in non-partisan elections would have to rely on other cues such
as name recognition, hardly better than party affiliation as an indi-
cator of a judge's qualifications for office.
The American Judicature Society, organized in 1913, adopted ju-
dicial selection reform as one of its founding objectives. 26 The So-
ciety offered a series of proposals for ensuring that experts, rather
than voters, would be responsible for selecting judges. The Soci-
ety's initial proposals called for the appointment of judges by an
elected chief justice.27 Over time, however, the Society's prefer-
ence became merit selection. In the merit selection system, a bi-
20. MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE L. LAFON, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE
CROSS-REVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACTICES 90 (1988).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accounta-
bility: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 345 (1984).
25. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 5.
26. MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, To IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 33-34 (1992).
27. Id. at 40-41, 51.
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partisan commission nominates judicial candidates for
appointment by the governor. After nomination, the judges are
subject to a retention election or some other means of confirma-
tion by legislative or popular endorsement. Merit selection was en-
dorsed by the American Bar Association in 1937, prompting
several bar associations to investigate merit selection as a possibil-
ity in their own jurisdictions.28
The advantages of merit selection are many. First and foremost,
the objective of merit selection is to remove partisan politics from
the selection of judges.29 By eliminating the party influence inher-
ent in an election, merit selection frees judges from any corrupting
influence of partisanship. With merit selection, party bosses cannot
use judgeships as rewards. The judiciary can render impartial deci-
sions without any appearance of impropriety from corrupt bargains
with parties. The result is enhanced public trust and confidence.
Eliminating judicial elections in favor of merit selection would
also remove a fiction from the judicial process-that judicial elec-
tions are democratic in nature and provide direct accountability to
the electorate.3 ° One powerful argument against merit selection is
that it deprives the public of the right to vote for public officials.
Judges already enjoy many powers generally perceived as undemo-
cratic, including the power to declare public laws unconstitu-
tional.31 Dispensing with popular election arguably removes a
powerful element of accountability. Yet, judicial elections are
often not competitive because powerful party leaders line up judi-
cial candidates and remove any real public say in the outcome.32
Merit selection, in contrast, is a more honest selection system, with
legitimate representatives of the public involved in the screening
processes.
With the elimination of elections, the need for campaign funding
is also eliminated. Campaign funding for judges has created many
problems. 33 The Model Code of Judicial Conduct includes a num-
28. BELKNAP, supra note 26, at 104-05.
29. Scott William Faulkner, Still on the Backburner: Reforming the Judicial Selec-
tion Process in Alabama, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1269, 1275 (2001).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by
Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397
(1999) (discussing the undemocratic power of justices in making decisions).
32. See generally Luke Bierman, Preserving Power in Picking Judges: Merit Selec-
tion for the New York Court of Appeals, 60 ALB. L. REv. 339 (1996).
33. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The Arkansas Courts: Observations on the
Wyoming Experience With Merit Selection of Judges, 17 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L.J.
281, 302-06 (1995).
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ber of restrictions on campaign conduct by judges.34 For example,
judicial candidates are not supposed to announce positions on is-
sues likely to come before them as judges. Likewise, they are not
supposed to solicit or accept campaign funds. Campaign fundrais-
ing should be done by campaign committees that operate under
numerous restrictions.36 These regulations are designed to insulate
the judge from political pressures resulting from political involve-
ment. In addition, these prohibitions are designed to limit percep-
tions of impropriety that result from campaign contributions.37
Merit selection eliminates both the political pressure and the per-
ceptions of impropriety.
Implementation of a merit selection system also acknowledges
the fact that judges generally attain the bench by appointment re-
gardless of formal selection systems. Even in states that use judi-
cial elections, many judges reach the bench through a system of
initial appointment after an interim vacancy. 38 Under these cir-
cumstances, the electorate is not presented with a choice but rather
a fait accompli accomplished without public input through a secre-
tive appointment process. Merit selection would shed light on the
selection process and add some public input through the nominat-
ing commission.
Merit selection may also increase diversity on the bench. Faced
with historical barriers to voting participation and the large dis-
tricts from which appellate judges typically run, candidates of color
for elected judgeships have to overcome significant obstacles.39
Merit selection, focusing more on qualifications than on political
alliances, would permit nontraditional candidates for the bench to
stand on their own achievements.
Another advantage of merit selection is its capacity to improve
the quality of judges. Judging requires both expertise and sensitiv-
34. It should be noted that these restrictions face increasing constitutional scrutiny
under freedom of expression provisions. Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d
854 (8th Cir.) (upholding the constitutionality of ethical canons proscribing a judicial
candidate from announcing certain positions on certain issues), cert. granted, 122 S.Ct
643 (2001); Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial
Ethics, 9 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 1059 (1996); William Glaberson, Court Rulings Curb Ef-
forts to Rein in Judicial Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2000, §A at 9.
35. Kelly, 247 F.3d at. 854; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2000).
36. Id.
37. See generally ABA, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE
ON LAWYERS' POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (1998).
38. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 9, at 92-93.
39. See generally Barbara L. Graham, Judicial Recruitment and Racial Diversity on
State Courts: An Overview, 74 JUDICATURE 28 (1990); Robert C. Luskin et al., How
Minority Judges Fare in Retention Elections, 77 JUDICATURE 316 (1994).
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ity to the judicial role, not only in dispute resolution, but also in the
American system of government. 40 These special demands, during
an era of increasing specialization, have placed particular emphasis
on the role of the judge as expert.41 Indeed, it was precisely this
role that motivated the American Judicature Society's interest in
judicial selection reform almost 100 years ago.42
The advantages of merit selection appealed to reformers seeking
to improve older judicial selection systems. Reports of inappropri-
ate political influence, questionable campaign conduct, and im-
proper fundraising offered merit selection advocates opportunities
for success in a number of states. Missouri and other states consid-
ered and adopted merit selection. 43 By the time of the fiftieth an-
niversary of Missouri's adoption of merit selection, thirty-three
states and the District of Columbia were using merit selection for
at least some judges.44
II. MERIT SELECTION IN RETROSPECT
As merit selection grew in popularity throughout the twentieth
century, some three quarters of the states adopted the use of a
nominating commission for choosing at least some of their judges.
With the increased use of nominating commissions came the inevi-
table assessments of merit selection's effectiveness. 45 These stud-
ies, analyses, and experiences have exposed a number of
weaknesses in merit selection. Perhaps foremost among merit se-
lection's flaws is the uncertainty over what the word "merit" means
with respect to judicial selection. The public appreciates that
judges require expertise to be effective.4 6 There are some gener-
ally accepted requirements, therefore, about who is professionally
qualified to be a judge.47 These requirements usually call for ad-
40. See generally William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A
Search for a Synthesis, 57 ALB. L. REV. 993 (1994).
41. Leslie Morsek, Get on Board for the Ride of Your Life!: The Ups, the Downs,
the Twists, and the Turns of the Applicability of the "Gatekeeper" Function to Scientific
and Non-Scientific Expert Evidence: Kumho's Expansion of Daubert, 34 AKRON L.
REV. 689, 726 (2001).
42. BELKNAP, supra note 26, at 33-34.
43. Jona Goldschmidt, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is Florida's Present Sys-
tem Still the Best Compromise?: Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Is-
sues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 20 (1994).
44. Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit Selection, 74
JUDICATURE 128 (1990).
45. Goldschmidt, supra note 43, at 20.
46. See BELKNAP, supra note 26, at 33-34.
47. See generally ABA STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, STAN-
DARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON STATE JUDI-
2002]
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mission to the bar or the attainment of a specific amount of legal
experience before one can become a judge.48 People expect that
judges will be trained as lawyers with experience doing what law-
yers typically do, whether as practioners, judges, or academics.49
This perception begs the question of what "merit" encompasses.
Do we prefer judges to pursue justice at the expense of efficient
administration? Which qualities of judging do we promote-com-
passion, intellectualism, fairness? Which qualities are appropriate?
Are the characteristics different for trial judges than for appellate
judges?
The ambiguity of merit selection becomes obvious when examin-
ing its adoption by the states. No two states have adopted merit
selection in quite the same way.50 Although the American Judica-
ture Society has developed model merit selection provisions,5 '
merit selection exists in the eyes of the beholder.5 2 Some merit-
based states use senate confirmation after gubernatorial appoint-
ment based on commission nominations. Other states use reten-
tion elections, 3 and still others do not require post appointment
validation. 4 Some nominating commissions are oriented towards
bar associations, while others focus on public representation. The
CIAL SELECTION STANDARDS (2000); Roger J. Miner, Remarks: Advice and Consent in
Theory and Practice, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1075 (discussing the qualifications used in
judicial selection generally).
48. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 47;
Miner, supra note 47.
49. It is interesting to note that unlike state constitutions, the U.S. Constitution
poses no formal prerequisites to serving as a federal judge. Expectations that a fed-
eral judge will be a lawyer, however, have become so ingrained in the fabric of our
legal culture that disputes arise not over whether a nominee is an attorney, but over a
nominee's legal training. Indeed, it is unthinkable that a nonlawyer might be nomi-
nated and confirmed to the federal bench. The guidelines followed by the American
Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary are as close to formal re-
quirements as might be found. See AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON FED-
ERAL JUDICIARY, WHAT IT IS AND How IT WORKS (1999); see also STEPHEN L.
WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 98-110 (4th ed.
1993).
50. Martha W. Barnett, The 1997-1998 Florida Constitution Revision Commission:
Judicial Election or Merit Selection, 52 FLA. L. REV. 411, 412 (2000).
51. MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS (American Judicature Society,
1994).
52. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best"
Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 30 (1995).
53. Erwin Chemerinsky, Presenting an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Con-
tribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 133, 133
(1998); Webster, supra note 52, at 34.
54. Herbert Jacob, The Effect of Institutional Differences in the Recruitment Pro-
cess: The Case of State Judges, 13 J. PUB. L. 104, 105 (1964) (explaining the different
processes used in judicial selection).
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methods of selection of nominating commission members also vary
greatly.55 General similarities include a commission, appointing
authority, and some method of confirmation. Still, the great varia-
tion adds uncertainty to the precise meaning of merit selection.
It must also be noted that eighty percent of judges must, at some
point in their careers, participate in an election.56 The merit selec-
tion debate sets up a false dichotomy between nominated judges
and elected judges. Many of the eighty percent of judges who are
elected were originally nominated in a merit-based system. The
implication that elected judges are not "merit-based" also dis-
counts the fact that some of the most respected jurists in our na-
tion's legal history came to the bench in elective systems.57 During
the early and mid twentieth century, when it was generally recog-
nized as the nation's preeminent common law court, the New York
Court of Appeals was made up of elected judges.58 Local elected
judges would undoubtedly take umbrage at the notion that they
are not of a sufficient quality to be characterized as merit based.
The difficulty of defining the meaning of merit in the judicial
selection context has attracted the attention of judicial scholars.
As judges selected through merit-based processes developed
records in the jurisdictions, these records could be compared to the
records of non-merit selected judges. These analyses tested the
claims that a merit-based system would result in better and more
qualified judges.5 9
Although an early study reported that different selection proce-
dures correspond to judges with specific characteristics,60 recent
examinations do not substantiate this conclusion. For example, a
comparison of Iowa's selection system with that of California pro-
vided little support for the proposition that merit selection pro-
55. See Victor E. Flango & Craig R. Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judi-
cial Selection Make? Selections Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JUST. SYs.
J. 25, 27 (1979).
56. Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 133.
57. Id. Examples include Benjamin Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals,
Howell Heflin of the Alabama Supreme Court, and Hans Linde of the Oregon Su-
preme Court.
58. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of
Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773 (1981); John H. Merryman, The Authority of
Authority, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954); John H. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Cita-
tions: An Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in
1950, 1960 and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977).
59. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
60. Jacob, supra note 54, at 113.
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duces more highly qualified judges. 61 A broader analysis of studies
of state high court judges also concluded that few differences could
be attributed to the use of a particular selection scheme.62 "[T]he
identity of the actor who exercises the dominant role in designating
nominees is at least as important and may be more important than
the nature of the name-generation process. ' 63 Merit selection in
and of itself does not generate judges with significantly different
characteristics than those judges selected by other means.
Analysis likewise indicates that the merit selection process does
not remove the effects of politics. Rather it alters the dynamics of
how political considerations are manifested. In an examination of
the Missouri system compiled some twenty years after its adoption,
the researchers concluded that partisan considerations were not
eliminated from the selection process but instead were redirected
to membership on the nominating commission.64 More recently,
an examination of the New York Court of Appeals' selection pro-
cess before and after the implementation of merit selection sug-
gested that not much had changed in the prevailing political forces
leading to judicial selection. 65 Indeed, at least some evidence sug-
gests that the adoption of the particular scheme for merit selection
process was designed to preserve the authority and role of certain
political actors in the selection system.66 From this perspective,
merit selection has undergone a metamorphosis from a tool for re-
form to a tool of the status quo.
The lack of movement toward merit selection in the last decade
has also been manifested by the increasing attention given to the
61. Larry L. Berg et al., The Consequences of Judicial Reform: A Comparative
Analysis of the California and Iowa Appellate Court Systems, 28 W. POL. Q. 263
(1975).
62. Flango & Ducat, supra note 55. But see Webster, supra note 52, at 33 (Al-
though the empirical data generally indicates that judicial quality is not related to
selection methods, some evidence suggests that judges chosen under a merit-based
system may perform their core responsibilities better than judges chosen in other
ways.).
63. Elliot E. Slotnick, Judicial Selection Systems and Nomination Outcomes: Does
the Process Make a Difference?, 12 AM. POL. Q. 225 (1984).
64. RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH
AND THE BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NON-PARTISAN COURT
PLAN (1969); see also Webster, supra note 52, at 32.
65. See Bierman, supra note 32, at 353.
66. Id. at 341-42. In New York, for examples, the political leadership that histori-
cally had selected candidates to run for election to the New York Court of Appeals
lost control of this authority in the early 1970s but regained control of the process
through its appointments to the judicial nominating commission when merit selection
was adopted in 1977.
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improvement of the electoral processes for judges. A variety of
organizations have suggested ways of improving the election
processes for judges to address the negative aspects of judicial elec-
tions in a more positive way, or at least in a way that does not have
severe negative implications for public trust and confidence. The
appointment of a Task Force on Lawyer's Political Contributions
by the American Bar Association (ABA) is a recognition that judi-
cial elections will continue in at least some jurisdictions.67 The
ABA's work on the public financing of judicial campaigns explicitly
acknowledges the impediments to merit selection's adoption in
some states and the fact that judicial elections will likely remain in
place.68 Even the American Judicature Society, historically identi-
fied with merit selection, has questioned whether it should involve
itself in reforming judicial elections.69
Some jurisdictions will never adopt merit selection, so a consid-
eration of alternative reform approaches is appropriate. The last
state to adopt merit selection was Rhode Island in 1994. Prior to
1994, the last state to adopt merit selection was New Mexico in
1988. Thus, in the last fourteen years only one state has been able
to muster the political force necessary to amend its constitution
despite egregious partisan election systems in states like Illinois,
Texas, Pennsylvania, and Louisiana.7 ° The fate of merit selection
for trial judges in Florida further emphasizes the ongoing decline
of merit selection. 71 In 1998, Florida's constitution was amended to
permit counties to adopt merit selection for trial judges by referen-
67. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 9.
68. AM. BAR Ass'N STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, COMMISSION
ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 5 n.3 (2001).
69. At its annual meeting in 2001, the focus of the Society's program was "What
Role for AJS in Reforming Judicial Elections?" Not all organizations that advocate
merit selection's adoption are trying to incorporate judicial election reform into their
program. Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, the preeminent advocate for merit se-
lection in Pennsylvania, has not withdrawn from its mission of amending the state
constitution in favor of merit selection for Pennsylvania appellate judges. The organi-
zation appears to have some hope for success. See supra note 17.
70. See, e.g., ELLEN MATTLEMAN KAPLAN, BLUEPRINT FOR THE FUTURE OF JUDI-
CIAL SELECTION REFORM (1999); SUPREME COURT OF TEX., STATE BAR OF TEX. &
TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN, THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
TEXAS-THE INSIDER'S PERSPECTIVE (1999); James Gill, Influencing Louisiana's Ju-
diciary, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 3, 1999; Daniel C. Vock, Business
Leaders See Supreme Court Race as Good Investment, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 13,
2001, at 1.
71. See Webster, supra note 52, at 27-28.
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dum.72 Florida voters in every country rejected the proposal in
2000. 3
IM. BEYOND MERIT SELECTION: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Some alternatives to merit selection will improve judicial inde-
pendence in general and state judicial selection in particular. Ef-
forts to improve judicial campaigns and elections are appropriate
and helpful."4 Other mechanisms, some derived from the U.S.
Constitution, can also protect the role of state judges. Authority,
tenure, and compensation can insulate judges from the influences
of partisans and special interests. In addition, by reconceptualizing
the purposes of merit selection, other ways to promote judicial in-
dependence become evident.
A. Authority
Over the past few years, the legislative and executive branches
have, on occasion, removed the judiciary's authority over issues in
order to accomplish particular policy goals. At the federal level,
Congress has restricted federal court jurisdiction in areas such as
habeas corpus and the death penalty,75 immigration, 76 and religious
freedom. 77  State governments have similarly restricted state
judges. Constitutional and statutory revisions proposed in a num-
ber of states limit state court authority over particular issues. 78
In Ohio, for example, a constitutional amendment has been pro-
posed to require a five vote supermajority by the state supreme
court in order for it to invalidate state legislation.7 1 This proposal
72. Barnett, supra note 50.
73. Indeed, the votes were so one-sided against merit selection that the difficulties
encountered with counting the Florida presidential ballots were not encountered in
this constitutional referendum anywhere in the state. See Editorial, supra note 15, at
B6.74. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note '47.
75. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1217 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.); Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 104 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25 and 42 U.S.C.).
76. See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997).
77. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107
Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000 bb) (1994).
78. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 31 (supporting the need to restrict judicial
independence in light of the excessive activism of courts).
79. Catherine Candisky, Proposal Would Limit Power to Undo Laws, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Aug. 24, 2001, at 1A.
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followed a series of four-three supreme court decisions invalidating
state laws on contentious issues like education funding and civil
justice reform. The representative proposing the revision indicated
that the supermajority requirement would impose "a little more ac-
countability, a little more stability and a little more confidence with
respect to the courts. 80
In New Hampshire, a pending constitutional amendment would
eliminate the state high court's authority over its rule making.8'
This proposal followed several years of heated litigation over how
to fund the state's educational system.82 The court had repeatedly
ordered New Hampshire to find new sources of revenue to com-
pensate for disparities in the real estate taxes funding education.83
In addition, the court had been embroiled in controversies over
some of its members' conduct, leading to one justice's resignation
and the chief justice's unsuccessful impeachment.84 Questionable
recusal procedures and concerns about the administration of inter-
nal court policies exacerbated tensions between the court and the
legislature, leading to proposals to restrict the supreme court's au-
thority.85 There also have been proposals to remove the supreme
court's jurisdiction over school funding cases.
In Florida, the first bill filed in the state House of Representa-
tives for the 2002 session would limit the availability of habeas
corpus writs and increase legislative authority over court rulemak-
ing.86 This proposal follows not only the controversial role of the
Florida courts in the 2000 presidential election, but also long stand-
ing disputes between the Florida Supreme Court and the state leg-
islature.87  These disputes originated with controversial state
80. Id. (quoting Ohio Representative Rex Damschroder).
81. See 2001 N.H.C.A.C.R. 4 (providing that Article 73-a of the Second Part of the
New Hampshire Constitution, relative to the chief justice as the administrative head
of all the courts, be repealed); 2001 N.H.C.A.C.R. 5 (providing that the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court's rules are effective only when not inconsistent with statute).
82. Attorney General McLauglin 'Misspoke' Before State Supreme Court, UNION
LEADER, Jan. 10, 2002, § A at 2.
83. See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 142 N.H. 462 (1997) (holding that
varying property tax rates violated the constitutional requirements for providing ade-
quate funding for public education).
84. Carey Goldberg, New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Is Acquitted in His
Impeachment Trial, N.Y. TIMES, §A, Oct. 11, 2000, at 4.
85. Shirley Elder, Supreme Court Controversies Have Staying Power, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 24, 2001, at 1 (New Hampshire Weekly).
86. Gary Blankenship, First House Bill Filed Would Rewrite Article V, FLA. BAR
NEWS, Aug. 15, 2001, at 1.
87. See, e.g., Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 100 n. 13
(1994) (describing the disagreement between the Florida legislature and the Florida
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supreme court decisions on abortion rights and the imposition of
capital punishment.88
At the turn of the twentieth century, numerous proposals were
made to rein in courts, largely in reaction to unpopular rulings.
Colorado amended its constitution to provide for popular review of
judicial decisions. Other states imposed recall provisions for
judges or required supermajority votes of high court judges to in-
validate state legislation.8 9 Theodore Roosevelt, embarking on a
highly publicized political comeback, proposed supermajority legis-
lation in New York following a 1911 high court decision striking
down New York's workmen's compensation law.90 While this
trend towards limiting courts faded in light of World War I, the
intrusions into judicial independence today are increasing in scope
and number. Thus, a century ago these intrusions led to the devel-
opment of merit selection, whereas today they occur at a time
when merit selection efforts clearly have stalled.
B. Tenure
The life tenure granted to federal judges is a powerful aspect of
judicial independence. Life tenure may be the most important in-
gredient in assuring federal judicial independence. 91 Certainly, the
Framers firmly supported life tenure for federal judges.92 Over the
past 200 years, the rarity of federal judicial impeachment reflects
the commitment to life tenure shared by American legal and politi-
cal culture.93
Life tenure and long terms promote judicial independence.
Long terms for elected judges diminish the number of times that
judges need to raise campaign funds, thus minimizing the appear-
Supreme Court with regard to the affirmative duties of therapists to warn of their
patients' dangerous tendencies).
88. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 31 (supporting the need to restrict judicial
independence in light of the excessive activism of courts).
89. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 9, at 108-09.
90. Id.; see also PETER GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF NEW YORK 205-06 (1996).
91. See Associate Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Remarks Delivered at the Confer-
ence of the Supreme Courts of the Americas (October, 1995), in 40 ST. Louis L.J. 989
(1996).
92. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
93. Indeed, there never has been a conviction of an impeached federal judge
solely on the basis of an unpopular judicial decision. See ABA, AN INDEPENDENT
JUDICIARY, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE 48-49 (1997). See also HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
42 (6th ed. 1993).
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ance of partiality94 and increasing public trust and confidence.
Long terms permit judges to concentrate on their judicial duties
rather than retaining their positions. Likewise, long terms diminish
the opportunity for political forces to infiltrate the judicial selec-
tion process. In addition, long terms provide the public with a
greater opportunity to assess the record of a particular judge when
the time for redesignation arises. These rationales explain the gen-
erally accepted value of life tenure for the federal judiciary.
State judiciaries are different. Summaries of state judicial terms
are provided elsewhere and need not be restated here.95 More
than seventy-five percent of state judges have terms for less than
ten years.96 State judges who must therefore devote themselves to
redesignation several times during their judicial careers are provid-
ing several opportunities for the intrusion of political influences.
The appropriate length for judicial terms is subject to interpreta-
tion. Although life tenure, or tenure to age seventy, on good be-
havior mirrors the federal model, some jurisdictions are not likely
to switch from relatively short terms to life tenure. In the current
political climate, some states have even suggested further limiting
judicial terms.97 Lengthy terms, however, promote judicial
independence.
The judges of New York's high court, appointed through a merit
selection appointment process, and those of New York's general
jurisdiction trial courts elected in judicial districts, both serve four-
teen-year terms, subject to mandatory retirement when the judge
reaches age seventy. 98 Under this scenario, a person who attains
the bench at age forty-two will face selection only twice-the initial
selection and a single reappointment or reelection. This length
neatly balances independence with accountability. The intrusion of
political interests is minimized with as few selection processes as
necessary for each individual judge. Still, the public, directly or
through representatives, has the opportunity to review a judge's
record at the end of a term so a reasonable assessment can be
made about retention. This method seems an appropriate way to
support independence and accountability if the federal model is
not to be followed.
94. David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of
the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 366 (2001).
95. See generally THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 9, at 90-92 app. II.
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Elder, supra note 85.
98. See N.Y. COURT OF APPEALS, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ctapps.
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C. Compensation
The constitutional ban on reducing federal judicial salaries pro-
vides an essential safeguard for judicial independence. Federal
judges know that Congress will not reduce their pay.99 This consti-
tutional proscription protects federal judges who make unpopular
decisions.100 This constitutional protection alone, however, has not
eliminated many concerns about federal judicial compensation. 10 1
In the absence of regular pay increases, inflation has eroded the
value of compensation.102 Linkage of federal judicial pay with con-
gressional salaries generates substantial concern about maintaining
adequate levels of pay for federal judges, who do not have the an-
cillary resources that members of Congress can tap.1 3 The increas-
ing spiral of lawyer salaries creates concerns about parity for
federal judges, the elite of the legal profession.
Despite these concerns, federal judicial compensation establishes
a benchmark for state judicial compensation. According to pub-
lished reports about state judge salaries, no state pays its trial
judges more than a U.S. district judge or its appellate judges more
than a U.S. Supreme Court Justice. 10 4 Twenty states use judicial
compensation commissions to establish salary levels, although the
effectiveness of these bodies ranges from inactive to advisory to
mandatory.1 0 5 In at least one state, judicial salaries correspond to
the consumer price index. 106 The compensation of most state
judges, then, is left to the vagaries of the legislature's erratic
attention.
The commission approach may be an appropriate method for pe-
riodic review and modification of judicial salaries. Other possibili-
99. At the time this is written, the salary of United States district judges is
$150,000; that of U.S. circuit judges is $159,100; that of Associate Justices of the Su-
preme Court of the United States is $184,400; and that of the Chief Justice of the
United States is $192,600. Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Sees a Loss of Prospective
Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at A16.
100. AM. BAR Ass'N & FED. BAR Ass'N, FEDERAL JUDICIAL PAY EROSION: A
REPORT ON THE NEED FOR REFORM ii (2000).
101. Id. at ii.
102. Id. at i.
103. Id. at i.
104. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 26 SURVEY OF JUDICIAL SALARIES
(2001), available at http://www.ncsc.dni.us/is/summer2001.pdf. Recent reports indi-
cate that some Alabama judges may receive salaries higher than those received by
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. Stan Bailey, Some State Judges'
Pay Tops U.S. Justices, Birmingham News, Oct. 1, 2001.
105. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 26 SURVEY OF JUDICIAL SALARIES
(2001)
106. Id.
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ties include a mechanism tying state judicial salary increases to the
cost of living so that an objective periodic adjustment can be made.
Such a mechanism would diminish subjective partisan bickering
over a topic so closely associated with judicial independence. Of
course, state judicial salaries must reflect the legal, political and
social cultures of a specific jurisdiction. But the value of judicial
independence should be constant throughout the country. There-
fore, consistency in the approach to judicial compensation seems
warranted and appropriate.
Factors associated with authority, tenure, and compensation of-
fer some modest assessments and proposals that will enhanc6 judi-
cial independence in the states. These aspects of judicial
independence connect to judicial selection, since both are constitu-
tionally recognized as essential components of protecting the third
branch. Still, they do not precisely address judicial selection in
general or the weaknesses of merit selection in particular. Accord-
ingly, merit selection needs to be rethought to better promote qual-
ity judicial candidates in a politically feasible manner, while
remaining true to judicial independence. This article suggests that
educational credentials be encouraged for those seeking a judicial
post.
IV. CREDENTIALING - THE REAL MERIT SELECTION
Judging is an imprecise science. The question of what makes a
good judge will never be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Nev-
ertheless, judges are professionals with some standard elements in
their job descriptions, albeit elements that may vary depending on
their jurisdiction and position. Regardless of whether they are as-
signed to family court or a court of appeals, judges must resolve
disputes within the parameters of a judicial process that is part of a
larger legal system."°7
Judges come from the legal profession and have legal training.1 0 8
They hold the credentials of a law degree, an undergraduate de-
gree, and a license, usually attained after passing a bar examina-
tion. Some jurisdictions impose other requirements such as a
certain number of years work experience, but no uniform standard
107. See LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS 148 (3d. ed. 1994).
108. Although there are some judges who can serve without legal training or expe-
rience, for example in New York town and village courts, these judges are relatively
few in number and generally are being phased out. Focusing on what typically are
characterized as courts of record, it is fair to say that judges are drawn from the ranks
of those with legal training.
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of further qualification exists. Indeed, even these limited prerequi-
sites are not officially specified for service on the federal bench.
This lack of formality seems odd when so many activities, from
brain surgery to taxidermy, require credentials. The increasing
professionalization of our society serves many purposes, including
training, regulation, and socialization." 9 As public officials, judges
are treated like other government officers whose service is depen-
dent on public approval and accountability through the electoral
process. The adoption of an earned credential system would distin-
guish judges from legislators and executives. This credential sys-
tem makes sense because judges serve a role that requires
impartiality and independence distinct from those serving in the
other branches of government, whose authority derives from their
representational role. This distinction serves as the basis for the
need for an educational credential.
Lawyers are advocates, representing a client zealously to the ex-
clusion of almost any other consideration. 1 0 Lawyers must keep
confidences" 1 to attain goals often at odds with the objectives of
other lawyers and their clients1 2 and protect their legal positions
with impunity.1 1 3 Balancing the interests of competing parties is
not part of a lawyer's job description. Indeed, lawyers are ex-
pected not to act impartially.
Judges, however, are a societal model of impartiality. Judges re-
solve the disputes that lawyers bring to their attention. The attrib-
utes one must have to perform the judicial role (knowledge of legal
rules, judicial temperament, administrative acumen) may come
from legal practice, but their application is very different from the
advocacy role that lawyers play. New judges may have little appre-
ciation for how the judicial process proceeds from a judge's per-
spective as an official obligated to move cases through the justice
system. 114
The lack of training for judges has been improved during the
past thirty years with the development of a number of programs.
The Federal Judicial Center and the National Judicial College pro-
vide significant offerings to help judges maintain their currency in
109. See, e.g., Blechner et al., The Jay Healey Technique: Teaching Law and Ethics
to Medical and Dental Students, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 439 (1994) (discussing the train-
ing, regulation, and monitoring of the professions).
110. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. (1995).
111. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1995).
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See BAUM, supra note 107, at 150-51.
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many fields. These organizations. also help new judges acclimate to
the demands of their new positions. Likewise, state court systems
have increased their continuing legal education for judges. The cre-
ation of the National Association of State Judicial Educators to
provide training, support, and assistance to judicial educators indi-
cates the professionalization of this trend. Indeed, the State Justice
Institute has made improving judicial education one of its highest
priorities.1 ' A recent collaboration between Pace Law School and
the New York State Office of Court Administration to develop a
training facility for state judges demonstrates a substantial commit-
ment to judicial education. 116
These resources and efforts, however, are only available after a
judge assumes the bench.1 7 Little is done to prepare judicial as-
pirants before taking the bench. As one commentator has con-
cluded, "the task of learning how to be a judge remains difficult
and largely unsystematic. ' '" 8
This state of affairs is in marked contrast to other nations with a
career judiciary." 9 Prospective judges in many other countries are
trained for the demands and responsibilities of judging at an early
point in their careers, so that a judicial temperament comes natu-
rally. Early training for judicial aspirants is just as appropriate as
law school for prospective lawyers.
Indeed, early and specialized judicial training may be even more
appropriate at a time when an informal career judiciary is develop-
ing in this country. 2 ° In marked contrast to the past, the trend for
selecting Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States is to
avoid nominees with broad experience.' 2 1 All current Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court served on appellate courts before
their appointment. 122 Chief Justice Rehnquist served for many
115. State Justice Institute, 66 Fed. Reg. 51746 (Oct. 10, 2001). See Generally Sa-
rah Famar, Striving for a Judicial Balance on the Bench, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Feb. 7, 2002, at 16.
116. Victoria Rivkin, Pace University Is Site for Judicial Institute, N.Y. L.J., July 22,
1999, at 1.
117. See generally Judith Resnik, Teaching Judges (2001) (unpublished paper
presented at the 2001 American Bar Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois
on August 7, 2001).
118. Baum, supra note 107, at 151.
119. Id. at 150.
120. This phenomenon was recognized by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Annual
Report on the Judiciary at the end of 2001.
121. See generally LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS (2000).
122. See www.usscplus.comlinfo/justices.htm.
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years as an Associate Justice before his elevation. 123 Several of the
current Justices were law faculty and none were broadly exper-
ienced public figures.124 Without minimizing the distinction these
Justices earned in prior positions, their career paths diverge from
those of the likes of John Marshall,' 25 Roger Taney, 26 Charles Ev-
ans Hughes,127 Earl Warren,'128 and Lewis Powell.129 These Justices,
like almost half of all Supreme Court justices, had no judicial expe-
rience when they first came to the Supreme Court. 130
The same trend toward a career judiciary exists at the state court
level. All six current Associate Judges of the New York Court of
Appeals served as elected judges before their appointment, and all
but one served on New York's intermediate appellate court. Chief
Judge Judith Kaye served almost a decade as an associate judge
before becoming chief judge. This trend toward a career judiciary
also finds support in the trend toward younger federal judges, at
least among those appointed to the federal bench in recent presi-
dential administrations.'3
Although the phenomenon of a career American judiciary may
not yet be substantiated by definitive study, the anecdotal evidence
is certainly apparent. If this trend is real, the need for career train-
ing before assuming a judicial post may be comparable to that in
countries where a career judiciary is well established. Even if the
trend proves illusory, the need for earlier and more thorough train-
ing for those contemplating a judicial career is not. Rather, the
need fits neatly with the predominant values of expertise through
education and training for those exercising important democratic
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xvi (2d ed. 1991).
John Marshall served in the Continental Army before practicing law. He served in
the House of Representatives and as secretary of state during the Adams administra-
tion. See Generally JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION
(1998).
126. Roger Taney served as attorney general and secretary of the treasury under
the Jackson administration. See STONE ET. AL., supra note 125, at xxii.
127. Charles Evans Hughes served as governor of New York, secretary of state and
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, as well as being an
unsuccessful presidential candidate before serving as Chief Justice. See id. at xiv.
128. Earl Warren served as governor of California. In 1948, he ran for vice presi-
dent and was defeated. See id. at xxiii.
129. Lewis Powell was a prominent Virginia attorney who served as president of
the American Bar Association and who was the head of the Richmond Board of Edu-
cation during the desegregation era. See id. at xvii.
130. See generally HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICE AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (3d. ed. 1992).
131. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 8.
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responsibilities without representational legitimacy like legislators
and executives.
The credential need not be a prerequisite for being a judge.
More than 200 years of history animate our judicial selection
processes and a wholesale abandonment of these processes is un-
likely. Rather, the training can create a pool of candidates for judi-
cial office who are well attuned to the judicial role before
beginning judicial service. Thereby, they can provide an element of
expertise regardless of the precise selection method, whether
elected or appointed. Providing the opportunity to acquire the ed-
ucational credential would assure an otherwise skeptical public
that those selected to serve as judges have sophisticated credentials
beyond mere legal training and experience. An educational con-
clusion would answer the complaints raised by the individuals who
question the relative advantages of merit selection or popular elec-
tion in their many guises. The credential would be a forceful decla-
ration that a particular judicial aspirant is specially qualified to
serve in the most important role in our judicial process.
To grant the credential, the educational program should be ad-
ministered by an institute designed to train those considering a ju-
dicial office. This institute would be distinguished from the Federal
Judicial Center and National Judicial College by its focus on train-
ing those who aspire to judicial office rather than those already in
judicial office. While the precise organization of such an institute is
well beyond the scope of this article, if the advocates of merit selec-
tion and judicial election reform marshaled their collective re-
sources to reconceptualize the judicial selection issue, these details
could certainly be developed and implemented in a fashion that
accomplishes many of the objectives sought by these advocates.
CONCLUSION
Many different factors affect judicial independence. Judicial au-
thority, selection, tenure, and compensation are among the most
important elements that define judicial independence. Even mod-
est changes to some of these attributes can impact the status of
judicial independence. Selection, perhaps the most visible of these
factors, offers some relatively clear choices as the debate over judi-
cial election reform and adoption of merit selection intensifies, at
least in some jurisdictions. The goal of a quality judiciary selected
by processes that appropriately balance independence and ac-
countability to enhance public trust and confidence in our justice
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system requires that creativity and sensitivity be applied to develop
fresh approaches to old problems.
The failure of merit selection to advance raises a concern about
its continued viability as a realistic policy alternative in the judicial
selection debate. By reconceptualizing the values and attributes
sought by merit selection, new methodologies can accomplish simi-
lar goals. The establishment of an educational credential to legiti-
mize judicial aspirants as worthy of judicial office can serve the
purposes sought through merit selection. An educational require-
ment will move the positive developing trends in judicial education
to a point where they can do even more good.
An educational credential will not solve all the problems associ-
ated with judicial selection. It will, however, offer an opportunity
to improve the judicial process, while remaining true to the founda-
tions of the American system of justice-independence, accounta-
bility, and impartiality.
